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Abstract—Mobile crowd-sourcing can become as a strategy to
perform time-sensitive urban tasks (such as municipal monitoring
and last mile logistics) by effectively coordinating smartphone
users. The success of the mobile crowd-sourcing platform depends
mainly on its effectiveness in engaging crowd-workers, and recent
studies have shown that compared to the pull-based approach,
which relies on crowd-workers to browse and commit to tasks
they would want to perform, the push-based approach can
take into consideration of worker’s daily routine, and generate
highly effective recommendations. As a result, workers waste
less time on detours, plan more in advance, and require much
less planning effort. However, the push-based systems are not
without drawbacks. The major concern is the potential privacy
invasion that could result from the disclosure of individual’s
mobility traces to the crowd-sourcing platform. In this paper,
we first demonstrate specific threats of continuous sharing of
users locations in such push-based crowd-sourcing platforms.
We then propose a simple yet effective location perturbation
technique that obfuscates certain user locations to achieve privacy
guarantees while not affecting the quality of the recommendations
the system generates. We use the mobility traces data we obtained
from our urban campus to show the trade-offs between privacy
guarantees and the quality of the recommendations associated
with the proposed solution. We show that obfuscating even 75%
of the individual trajectories will affect the user to make another
extra 1.8 minutes of detour while gaining 62.5% more uncertainty
of his location traces.
I. INTRODUCTION
Mobile crowd-sourcing is an emerging paradigm where
tasks requiring the physical presence of a worker at specific
locations are distributed to, and completed by, a community
of voluntary individuals. Examples of these tasks include,
but not limited to, citizen sensing [1], [2], campus moni-
toring [3], [4], environment monitoring [5], [6], and crowd
logistics (e.g., Amazon Flex1 and Courex Singapore2). Such
mobile crowd-sourcing platform’s success depends mainly on
its effectiveness in engaging crowd-workers, which can be
done via either the “pull” or “push” approaches. The pull
approach, which is widely adopted in almost all commercial
systems, relies on crowd-workers to browse and commit to
tasks they would want to perform (usually with distance-
based filtering or sorting). The push approach, on the other
hand, proactively recommends tasks to a worker that the
platform believes will best cater to her daily routines. Prior
work has demonstrated [3], [4] that, when provided with
1https://flex.amazon.com/
2https://www.courex.com.sg/
adequate individual mobility traces, push-based systems can
significantly increase the productivity of workers: they waste
less time on detours and are able to plan more in advance .
However, the effectiveness of the push-based mobile crowd-
sourcing platform depends mainly on the knowledge of in-
dividual’s location traces, and releasing them continuously
to a third-party raises privacy concerns [7], [8], [9] to the
users. The continuous release of a user’s whereabouts can
reveal potentially sensitive details about a user’s profile (e.g.,
her health or relationship status), and even used for stalking.
Hence, supporting user location privacy is a desirable goal for
push-based mobile crowd-sourcing, as else workers may be
reluctant to embrace the platform.
Prior solutions for privacy, provided in the context of loca-
tion based services [8], [9] find nearest points of interest (such
as restaurants and supermarkets) without revealing the actual
user locations. However, for mobile crowd-sourcing, detour-
minimizing recommendations obviously depend on having ac-
curate knowledge of an individual user’s trajectory. In addition,
the threat may come from the crowd-sourcing platform itself,
which can utilize the user location profiling for its own bene-
fits. Prior solutions that have recommended the use of a trusted
proxy fail on this account. Such solutions include k-anonymity
[8], [10], data generalization [11], use of cryptography tools
[12] and differential privacy [13], [14], [15]. Therefore, we
desire a method that does not anonymize users, but rather
enables “adequate” trajectory obfuscation, without having to
trust any external platforms. We are thus particularly interested
on the impact and mechanisms for location privacy under the
push-based trajectory aware mobile crowd-sourcing model.
In this paper we propose a mechanism for protecting privacy
of workers’ locations, where the users obfuscate sensitive
locations independently, at-source. The crowd-sourcing server
then has access only to the noisy, obfuscated data. Since the
server has to generate task recommendations for workers (by
matching their daily routine path), data perturbation should
try to preserve the platform’ salient objectives: minimizing the
travel overheads experienced by the workers, and effectively
assigning tasks to achieve desired task completion rate . The
privacy and performance goals are thus conflicting ones, as
excessive data perturbation may convert a user’s actual tra-
jectory to a completely distant one, resulting in inappropriate
task recommendations.
Our main contributions are:
• We first demonstrate the specific threats of sharing user
locations in the context of push-based mobile crowd-
sourcing. We use raw mobility traces of students belong
to our urban Singapore Management University (SMU)
campus to infer some personal details: matriculation year
and school of study. After demonstrating that we achieve
high precision in inferring these personal details (83% and
87%, respectively) we propose a mechanism that doesn’t
require the users to trust any third party while obfuscating
the sensitive locations at the user-end.
• We conduct an extensive set of experiments on mobility
traces at SMU, and show that the simple location ob-
fuscation technique proposed is able to provide location
privacy guarantees without significantly degrading the
utility of the platform.
II. RELATED WORK
Mobile crowd-sourcing has recently become a popular ap-
proach for executing a variety of location-specific tasks in ur-
ban environments. The commercial operators, such as FieldA-
gent (www.fieldagent.net), GigWalk (www.gigwalk.com), and
NeighborFavor (www.favordelivery.com) have already been
using mobile crowd-sourcing, where, users pull tasks by
browsing through the entire pool sorted by proximity to their
current locations. Push based models [16], [17], in contrast,
utilize history-based predictions of a user’s likely movement
behavior to recommend tasks that lie along, or close to, such
movement paths.
Driven by concerns on the consequences of privacy breach-
es, past work has looked at mechanisms to share location
data while preserving privacy. The early works in this area
used cryptographic tools [18] to retrieve the information in a
private way only between the authorised parties,while barring
the access to any other third parties. Masking the locations by
using spatial k-anonymity [8], [9] (where the location of a user
is hidden among (k-1) other users who are sharing similar tra-
jectories) was also proposed. The above mentioned techniques
use a trusted third party in the middle, to encrypt/anonymize
the user locations. A major threat with these approaches is that
the trusted third party in the middle becomes a single point of
attack. Alternative methods such as privately assigning spatial
tasks [19] and private data collection [20] are also proposed;
however they fail to consider the impact of such techniques
on the accuracy of the recommendations being made.
In recent years, the concept of differential privacy has been
explored for location-based applications [14], [15], [13]. The
key idea here is to mask a user’s actual location to an obfus-
cated location by applying Laplace noise chosen based on pre-
defined parameters. Very recently, an interactive toolbox called
PrivGeoCrowd [21] was proposed to make the “choosing the
appropriate parameters to achieve differential privacy” process
more intuitive. In our work, we consider push-based crowd-
sourcing mechanism, where continual update of user locations
is essential to effectively recommend tasks that lie in close
proximity to the user’s daily movement trajectories. Our main
focus is on providing enough privacy protection guarantees
to the users while generating meaningful task assignments. In
this paper, we adopted a simple perturbation technique that
has far better assignment precision even with the perturbed
trajectories.
III. SYSTEM MODEL
A. Crowdsourcing System
We have evaluated our privacy preserving technique in the
context of TA$Ker, a mobile crowd-sourcing application that
we have developed and deployed in Singapore Management
University (SMU). TA$Ker is designed for both Android and
iOS users and enables them to report the status of various facil-
ities management related resources (e.g., restroom cleanliness,
stock level of vending machines, just to name a few).
The first version of TA$Ker (with 80 participants over a
trial period of 4 weeks) was previously described in [3]. It
demonstrated that a push-based platform, which is centrally-
coordinated and trajectory-aware, can produce much better
results than the conventional pull-based model. More specif-
ically, we showed how its trajectory-aware task recommen-
dation engine can accurately predict worker trajectories (even
though the location tracking system is not fine-grained) via
the estimation of key reference locations (the locations where
users stayed for longer). We demonstrated that such a recom-
mendation strategy is effective, even when task execution time
windows were limited to 30 minutes: guided users incur only
3 minutes of detour on average, compared to 6 minutes of
detour from the alternative strategies. However, as predicted
trajectories are used to recommend tasks, the platform did not
provide location privacy to users.
B. Trajectories
We utilize user’s historical mobility traces to predict their
trajectories for three distinct 3-hour time windows daily:
(a) 9am-12pm, (b) 12pm-3pm, and (c) 3pm-6pm. Mobility
traces are presented as a series of tuples in the form of
< parID, locID, timestamp >, where parID is an anonymized
device ID and locID is a location coordinate represented in the
form of < Buiding,Floorlevel,LandmarkID > (with 3 meters
of location granularity). The location coordinate is obtained
using a Wi-Fi fingerprinting technique, similar to the approach
[22] (medium-grained granularity with a median accuracy of
6-8 meters and update frequency of 2-4 minutes).
For each 30-minute time segment, we extract reference
locations – location where a user spends most time at. For
each 3-hour time window, a route is constructed by connecting
these reference locations. To account for the stochastic nature
of user’s movement patterns, we maintain k most probable
routes for each 3-hour time window. The actual walking
path between consecutive reference locations is obtained by
applying a standard shortest path finding algorithm. These
predicted walk paths are subsequently used to generate task
recommendations to individual workers to minimize expected
detours/travel overheads.
Our goal is to prevent any honest-but-curious adversary
from extracting sensitive information in a context-aware (push-
based) crowd-sourcing system, where user trajectories are used
to generate efficient task recommendations. In this paper, we
propose to randomly mask a user’s sensitive location reports
(to be defined later) to ensure location privacy. To achieve this,
we have to provide answers to the following questions:
• Given trajectory traces from a user, how can an attacker
identify sensitive information about particular workers?
• How do we quantify the privacy loss/gain of the user
trajectories after they have been masked?
C. Performance Metrics
We focus on the following performance metrics:
• Average Detour: Since the locations are obfuscated, it
will be a challenge for the platform to accurately predict
the detour that the user has to make (i.e., distance between
the task and user). This will likely increase the deviation
that the worker needs to make from her true movement
path, to perform the recommended tasks. Our goal here
is to ensure that user is not exceeding his travel budget
to execute the tasks that lie farther from his routine path.
• Worker Productivity: Due to the location data uncer-
tainty, the server may recommend tasks that lie too far
from his real routine path. This can cause a worker to
perform fewer tasks before her travel overhead budget is
depleted, resulting in lower rewards earned.
IV. DATA PERTURBATION FOR TRAJECTORIES
In this section we describe our approach. First we show how
an adversary can use the mobility traces data to infer sensitive
details about them. Next, we present how our approach min-
imizes the risk of being physically identified by an attacker.
Finally, we present how the effectiveness and the efficiency of
the mobile crowd-sourcing system is affected by employing
privacy preserving techniques.
Fig. 1. Perturbing Trajectories
A. Exposing Privacy Loss
To illustrate how easily user location privacy is compro-
mised in mobile crowd-sourcing platforms, we consider an
honest but curious adversary that follows the system protocol,
but is curious to analyse the user trajectories. The adversary
can be a server (compromised) that maintains the raw location
traces and/or trajectories in its data storage. The adversary
is curious to extract additional information from the data to
estimate workers’ frequent trajectories and sensitive locations.
We illustrate such potential privacy risks by considering the
mobility traces (landmark level granularity) and the predicted
trajectories of students of our SMU campus. By considering
spatio-temporal stay patterns of the students, we show that
an adversary can infer an individual’s school of study and
matriculation year with high accuracy.
Over the period of observation, for each student, we obtain
their stay locations (i.e., in locations where a student stayed
more than 5 minutes) as a tuple (u, l, t), where u is the
anonymised ID of the student, l is the location ID and t is
the time stamp. In addition, we leverage the publicly available
SMU class timetable. Each individual entry in this dataset
is associated with a tuple <course ID, location, class day,
start time, end time> – this corpus of classes are matched
against student’s spatio-temporal stay episodes, and we are
able to predict the school of study and matriculation year
with 87% and 83% precision and 74% and 73% recall. This
is an illustration of the type of profile information that may
be inferred, simply from a cursory analysis of the physical
movement traces of crowd-workers.
B. Entropy as a Measure of Privacy
Obfuscation Technique: We use a simple and natural
technique by which the user trajectories are obfuscated before
storing in the server. For each most sensitive location that is
part of user trajectories, a cloaked location is substituted that
lies within certain radius r from the original location. The
radius r will be adjusted to provide different levels of privacy.
Example 1. Consider a trajectory Ti of user Ui, with loca-
tions <library, classroom X of build. A, food court, classroom
Y of build. B> A reasonable selection of the radius might be:
r = 1 minute – adjacent room, r = 2 minutes – location in
adjacent floor level, r = 5 minutes – location anywhere in the
building, r = 10 minutes – location that is 2 buildings away,
and r = 15 minutes – location that is 3 buildings away. Note
that r is measured as walking time in minutes, so r = 5 implies
that the real location of the user trajectory is substituted by
any random location within the same building. In this example,
assume, the user’s visit to classroom X of building A is highly
probable (i.e., he attends a class regularly on the same day of
the week throughout the semester), then with the proposed
technique with r = 15 minutes, classroom X will be replaced
by classroom P of building D and the masked trajectory T´i will
be <library, classroom P of build. D, food court, classroom
Y of build. B>. The perturbing mechanism is illustrated in
Fig. 1. To further enhance privacy, certain proportion of the
original trajectory (i.e., 25%, 50% etc.) can be masked using
the same technique described above.
Privacy Loss Quantification: First, we need a way to
quantify the information loss for a user whose real trajectory
is exposed. For this purpose, we utilise entropy, a well-known
approach to measure unpredictability. Entropy measures the
information in a given probability distribution. To compute
the entropy for trajectory Ti (in 3-hour time window), we first
assign for each location l ∈ Ti a score score(l):
score(l) =
Stay time at location l
total stay time across all locations
(1)
where stay time represents continuous episode of staying
(i.e., not moving) at a particular location in a 3-hour time
window. This score is observed across multiple time windows
in a day and also across multiple days to derive probability as
an average of the scores observed.
Example 2. Consider user U1 has following trajectory:
TABLE I
USER U1’S TRAJECTORY FOR EACH TIME WINDOW FOR 2 DAYS.
Days Trajectories Score
D1, TW1 < l1, l2, l3 > (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
D1, TW2 < l1, l3, l4 > (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
D1, TW3 < l1, l2, l5 > (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
D2, TW1 < l2, l4, l6 > (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
D2, TW2 < l3, l5, l6 > (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
D2, TW3 < l4, l5, l6 > (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)
So his predicted trajectory will be T1 = < l1, l2, l3, l4, l5, l6 >
with associated probabilities of 1/6 for each location.
We denote entropy H for the trajectory Ti as: H(Ti) =
−∑l∈Ti Pr(l)log(Pr(l)).
Now we use the perturbation technique mentioned above
(associated with the relevant obfuscation parameter), to mask
the most probable locations of a user’s trajectory. Once the
perturbed trajectory is generated, probability for each masked
location l´ is estimated as the global popularity of it, and
estimated by:
Pr(l´) =
number of users at location l
total number of users
. (2)
Entropy for perturbed trajectory T´i is then calculated as
H(T´i) =−∑l´∈T´i Pr(l´)log(Pr(l´)).
We use the difference between two entropy measures ∆H =
H(T´i)−H(Ti), to determine the entropy gain – improvement in
unpredictability of user trajectories. Assume that the sensitive
locations are the mostly stayed/frequent locations. In our
experiments we consider obfuscating most frequent locations
(x% of the locations in a trajectory).
C. Effect of Obfuscation on Performance
The twin goals of the crowd-sourcing platform are (1) to
provide sufficiently accurate recommendations to the workers
(i.e., minimizing the detour the worker might incur), and
(2) achieve higher task completion rate, despite the inherent
deliberately-introduced uncertainty in the obfuscated user tra-
jectories.
Average Detour: Travel detour is critical in mobile crowd-
sourcing, as workers’ physical presence at the task locations is
necessary. However, when the server tries to match workers to
tasks using sanitized trajectories, workers may need to travel
farther to perform tasks.
For a given set of tasks, we first generate the list of
recommendations (matching workers and tasks) by applying
a state of the art algorithm described in [3]. To evaluate the
effect of obfuscation on performance of the system, we first
calculate average walking distance per user basis as detour
since the user has to deviate from his original travel pattern.
We denote the task location as L, location the user stayed
before and after visiting the task location as X , and Y . The
detour time is then (tX ,L + tL,Y )− tX ,Y , where tX ,L denotes the
travel time to reach location L from location X .
This metric is compared against the average detour incurred
when the sanitized trajectories are used to generate recommen-
dations. Note that in the second scenario, the original (true)
traces of users’ trajectories are used to calculate the actual
detour from recommended tasks. The difference between these
two average measures helps us to understand the quality of the
recommendations generated when the locations are perturbed.
This can be one of the direct measures of performance loss.
Worker Productivity: To measure a worker’s productivity,
we calculate the average number of tasks he can complete
in a time window under certain detour budget for both (a)
non-private (no obfuscation is done to the user trajectories),
and (b) private (where certain proportion of the trajectory is
obfuscated) scenarios. The intuition is as we obfuscate the
trajectories, the users may need to deviate significantly from
their routine path to perform the specified tasks. This may
result in a user completing a smaller number of tasks, thereby
reducing the rewards earned. This earning loss may be viewed
as the “privacy penalty”.
V. EXPERIMENTAL EVALUATION
In this section we present experimental evaluation of our
method. We utilised the Wi-Fi indoor localisation data to
derive user trajectories and the state of the art algorithm
described in [3] to generate task recommendations. Tasks
are evenly distributed among 5 academic buildings plus the
concourse of SMU campus (600 tasks per building per day)
while allowing each task to be completed by 3 users. We
consider 750 students who registered with the TA$KerApp
during our trial period September 19th – October 28th.
Privacy Evaluation Fig. 2 shows how we address the identifi-
cation/profiling threats by perturbing the longer-stay locations
(sensitive locations) – we present the entropy gain (in Y-axis)
by perturbing (with various obfuscation parameters , depicted
in X-axis) certain proportion of the trajectories. We see that,
as expected, the gain in entropy/uncertainty increases as we
obfuscate the sensitive location with a location that is farther
away from it (i.e., higher r). However we also notice that
the gain is not very significant when we obfuscate further –
the difference in gain when r = 5 minutes vs. 15 minutes is
nearly negligible. This suggests that even a modest degree of
obfuscation r = 5 (building-level randomization) can deliver
a decent entropy gain (around 53%), with only 25% of the
trajectories are masked. Further, a similar trend is observed
while varying the proportion of the individual trajectories
masked (in our experiment we masked 25%, 50% and 75%
of individual trajectories)– the gain in entropy increases as we
obfuscate more locations of the trajectory. This suggests that
even a simple, but targeted, perturbation of a user’s trajectory
can effectively increase the uncertainty.
Fig. 2. Entropy Gain
Performance of the System In Fig. 3(a) we depict the
performance loss (difference in worker travel distance when
private and non-private mechanisms are used) vs. various r
values. We note that, for smaller r values (≤ 5 minutes), the
privacy-imposed obfuscation does not significantly affect the
worker travel distance. This increase is, however, significant
at higher values of r. We see that with r= 5, a user will incur
48% more detour (1.8 minutes more, compared with his true
average detour of 3.8 minutes) while 75% of his trajectories
are masked. At this operating point, the system effectively
provides 62.5% more uncertainty (higher entropy) in user
trajectories, while increasing the average detour experienced
by ≈50%. (The 50% increase translates to a relatively modest
1.8 minute increase in absolute terms, which is not very
significant in the context of SMU’s urban campus).
In Fig. 3(b) we illustrate the average number of tasks a
user can complete with a detour budget of 30 minutes. On Y-
axis, we plot the percentage of recommended tasks completed
when trajectories are perturbed as compared to the non-private
system. In the hypothetical private scenario, we assumed users
complete the tasks in the order of recommendation. We see that
with the increasing r, the users complete lesser number of tasks
compared to the system where such perturbations are absent.
Moreover, as more locations in the trajectories are obfuscated,
the completion rate drops even further, specially for larger
values of r= 10 and 15 minutes. Specifically, with 75% of
locations obfuscated, a user will gain 62.5% more uncertainty
(privacy), while sacrificing detour (50% more – equivalent to
1.8 minutes) and rewards (35% lesser rewards – equivalent
to $1.10). This gives us hope that by carefully choosing the
obfuscation parameter, the user can achieve greater level of
privacy without incurring prohibitive increase in detour or loss
in rewards.
VI. DISCUSSION
Impact on Pricing: As we see, imposing privacy techniques
result in longer detours than expected. One way to compensate
the worker for this additional travel overhead will be to assign
higher rewards to the individual tasks. However, it will have a
negative impact on the task requester as he has to invest more
to ensure that the task remains attractive to the users.
Composable Privacy: In this proposed mechanism, we only
considered how to protect location privacy for each individual
round of recommendation (each 3-hour window) in isolation.
However when the system has to generate recommendations
across multiple days/weeks, users may generate traces and
reveal their new sensitive locations where they are forced to
perform tasks. Therefore, it is important for us to study the
possible gradual release of private information over time.
Generalizing our Study: We note that this experiment
was carried on an urban campus (4 academic buildings and 1
library – indoor campus), and additional measures should be
taken to study the feasibility of applying the same technique
on large scale city-wide deployments. In our prior studies
[3], [4], we have shown that other crowd-sourcing related
characteristics (such as analysis of worker supply, worker
behaviours etc.) are consistent with observations made for
city-wide crowd-sourcing. Whether this consistency applies to
privacy-related observations is an open question.
Location Privacy: In this work, we aimed to protect the
privacy of sensitive locations in the trajectory, and we do not
aim at providing privacy for the entire trajectory (i.e., in this
paper we don’t consider the temporal aspect of locations).
More specifically we reserve for future work questions such
as: (1) how unique is a user’s trajectory before and after
obfuscation? and (2) how distinguishable is a temporally
cloaked trajectory as opposed to the original one?
VII. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we showed that a simple trajectory obfus-
cation technique to provide location privacy, can be effective
enough in providing decently accurate recommendations while
enabling the participation of workers without compromising
their location privacy. This trajectory obfuscation is essential
to ensure that privacy is protected even after releasing the
routine trajectories. As an initial exploration, we proposed a
(a) Detour (b) Productivity
Fig. 3. Efficiency of the System: (a) Additional Detour Incurred and (b) % of Tasks Completed
simple algorithm that effectively obfuscates the more domi-
nant (higher stay time) locations of individual user trajectories,
and empirically investigated obfuscation parameter settings
that achieve high location privacy with low detour. Using
experimental results on mobility traces data we demonstrated
that the proposed technique is effective: even if 75% of the
locations in an individual trajectories are perturbed, a user will
end up with relatively modest increases in detour (about 1.8
minutes) and loss of rewards (approx. $1.10), while gaining
62.5% of uncertainty in his trajectory. This gives us hope
that by carefully choosing the obfuscation parameter, the user
can achieve high levels of privacy with relatively little loss in
productivity.
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